Afterthoughts
A few hours have passed since Bill and I released the presentation on al-Qaeda and the International Islamic Front's attacks since 1998. The general response has been supportive and understanding of our intent. There have been some, as expected, detractors and others who wondered why this or that terrorist action was left out of the presentation. We purposefully left editorial commentary, methodology and personal ideology out of the presentation and, so, expected that to cause some discussion or disagreement. No problem.
Given the number of attacks, the range of organizations, the inescapable challenge of meeting others expectations or vision for such an effort, it seemed to us that we were better served by providing data on a limited number, an example set perhaps, of what Islamofascist aligned to varying degrees with al-Qaeda had been up to. This also enabled us to make the presentation manageable in terms of length, file size, etc.
Some have questioned our limited use of attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, and frankly that is a justifiable concern, if it is the focus of ones view of the larger war. Our view remains broader. One critic of the presentation, who described it as a "mess" in a comment on one blog, and then challenged it further on his own blog saying "it is very clear to me that Roggio's and Hutchen[s’] flash animation really doesn't do anything to resolve the debate one way or another." That works for me. It wasn't meant to resolve the debate. It was meant to present a portion of the data and to remind those who, as do we all, have lives to live and aren’t constantly focused on these acts.
For those, like the above linked critic, who believe we've made an argument, and by leaving out data we've misrepresented the truth... I disagree. Each viewer brings with them a set of beliefs about the war (and any of its particular fronts) and in doing so this one has chosen to challenge our presumed takes without evidence of it in the presentation. Maybe it wouldn't be as concerning if a Ph.D wasn't attached to his name.
Specifically regarding Iraq and the oft discussed question of it's role in the war, and specifically whether or not it caused or inflamed current terrorist activities, or as the critic says - "expanded the recruitment pool and the broader base of support for Islamic terrorists" - again I must take issue. The base of al-Qaeda's or any Islamofascist organization's recruiting pool doesn't increase or decrease based on our action or any ability to support or deny the al-Qaeda narrative. The ideological fermentation begins without us and when it’s mature the new terrorist will act within the constraints of his convictions and resources available to him. Many peaceful Muslims stand beside tomorrow's terrorist in daily prayers with little to no knowledge of their ideological take or their proclivity toward terror. Is he a terrorist only when he begins to act on his belief or is he a terrorist when the rot of hatred consumes his heart and faith?
Others have also questioned the inclusion of Beslan in the presentation. While it wasn't the most straightforward of choices, the evidence and the State Department's words "Basayev has links to al-Qaeda" were enough to sway me toward the belief that Riyadh us-Saleheen Martyrs' Brigade and Shamil Basayev (who claimed responsibility for the act) are affiliated, although most likely not in a subordinate relationship, with al-Qaeda and the IIF movement and thus warranted inclusion. Additionally, al-Qaeda’s use of the Beslan attacks as a recruitment tool and rallying cry signified their ideological similarity making the decision easier. To exclude the Basayev led terror we would have to accept his word that he seeks only to defeat Russia, and to ignore his direct words of support for the terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere. In the end, that wasn’t something I could do.
As I noted in my earlier post, it’s your turn to discuss this and provide the commentary. I’ll have more to say later.
