Being Bashar
Bashar Assad is in quite a pickle. Having come to power following the death of his father, the Middle East should have been an ideal place for a young totalitarian just learning the ropes. Unfortunately for Bashar he has neither his father’s Machiavellian mastery of politicking, nor the luxury of coming to power an age void of geopolitical focus on other parts of the world, such as the Cold War provided. With the successful U.S. War on Terror just miles from his home, the Arab street becoming more self critical - desirous of self governance and empowered by support from afar, Bashar has found himself forced to withdraw from Lebanon and now sits isolated and fermenting under the eyes of the world.
This week we learned that Syria has "severed all links" to the U.S. military and CIA in Iraq. Much as I would have responded, the U.S. seems to have given this announcement a collective "yawn." Why? Because Syria was never an ally in the War on Terror and their "minimal and sporadic" assistance was an attempt to quiet the criticism of newly free Iraq and U.S. commanders dealing with Syria's either porous border or direct support for the terrorists crossing it.
Popular, in as much as enough discussion has been made to qualify as popular, theories for why Syria has cut its minimal assistance to U.S. operations range from the conspiratorial – Zarqawi being recently injured and running to Syria needing cover; to the openly outlandish – Syria needs to cut ties before moving their forces into place for an attack. I don't subscribe to either, and will offer alternative reasoning. I'll be the first to admit that sufficient data isn't available to support any theory or to predict the next step - unless we believe that Imad Mustapha, Syria's ambassador to the U.S., was telling the truth and Syria just didn't see the point in helping if they are going to be criticized so harshly, poor things.
The two reasons for cutting off aid are: 1) Given the unrest brewing in Syria, a first for Syria, Assad recognized the need to ensure that Islamists don’t refocus their attention on his government – freshly under attack from moderate and secular Muslims; and 2) Assad just doesn't understand that his government, like that of Mubarak in Egypt, needs to embrace the West for support (many Westerners still preferring stability) rather than breaking ties and waiting on the eventual eye of the storm to hit Damascus.
These two reasons leave out the Kurds in Syria, a large and well organized group certainly displeased with the state of affairs in Syria, emboldened by the success of the Kurds in Iraq, and not satisfied by recent concessions such as the establishment of the a government council to deal with Kurd issues. Daily Star writer Ibrahim Hamidi believes the Kurds hold the key to Syria's future, or perhaps to the future of the Assad regime.
While Hamidi may place an extra significance on the Kurd influence, I would grant that the Kurds are influential and not ignored when Assad looks at his future options. Unfortunately, the real key is Assad's unwillingness to separate from Iran. Until he does, Syria will not be free to explore "slow" advancement in self governance, nor will they be able to address U.S. concerns about Syria’s influence in Lebanon (even without the military presence), or support for terrorists in Iraq (or Israel and the Palestinian Territories).
My advice to Bashar:
Break your ties to Iran and implement the process of moving towards becoming a modern and free nation, or else you will eventually face the rapid end to your significance in Syria.
[Originally posted at The Fourth Rail.]
