Nuclear North Korea
North Korea has nuclear weapons. Of course this isn’t news, it’s just an admission of the truth. The history of North Korea’s dealings on this issue does not bode well for those who believe that diplomacy will resolve the issue. Diplomacy requires a level of participation and trustworthiness on the part of all involved that North Korea cannot supply.
Here’s a look at the history that leads me to that conclusion, although this is by no means comprehensive in that it does not address the human rights issues or missile technology sales issues relating to North Korea’s trustworthiness, or South Korea’s questionable moves, since 1998, and negative impact associated with them.
- 1985: North Korea Signs the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) but fails to sign an agreement with the IAEA, as required, to permit inspections of nuclear facilities, claiming it will not do so until the U.S. removes nuclear weapons from South Korea.
- 1991: After the U.S. unilaterally removes tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea; the two Korea’s sign an agreement to ensure the Korean peninsula remains a nuclear weapons free area.
- 1992: Initial inspections by the IAEA discover disparities in North Korea’s required declaration of nuclear activities.
- 1993: North Korea withdraws and then reaccepts the NPT, with the assurance of the U.S. against aggression by the U.S. and interference in internal North Korean politics.
- 1994: The CIA concludes that North Korea may have as many as 2 nuclear weapons. The IAEA begins inspections again; discovering that North Korea is wrongfully removing spent fuel from a nuclear research facility.
After North Korea claims to no longer participate in the IAEA, former President Jimmy Carter negotiates North Korea’s "freeze" on its nuclear weapons program. The "Agreed Framework" between the U.S. and North Korea is signed, negotiated by Robert Gallucci. Under the "Agreed Framework" the U.S. will move to normalized economic relations, provide aid, and agree to the development of light-water nuclear power facilities in North Korea; the North Korean’s agree to eliminating their existing facilities and the weapons program, and to special inspections by the IAEA.
The focus of U.S./North Korea diplomacy shifts to missile technology proliferation.
- 2000: The U.S. removes sanctions on North Korea, excepting missile technology sanctions and terrorism. This followed the North-South agreement to resolve the issue of reunification. Secretary of State Albright visits Pyongyang, and there are hints that President Clinton will before the end of his term. He does not, and later, March 2001, the NYTimes relates that it was due to Sandy the Burglar, National Security Advisor at the time, not wanting the President to go during a potential "constitutional crisis."
- 2001: President Bush and Secretary Powell readiness for further discussions with North Korea. North Korea claims readiness for "dialogue and war."
- 2002: President Bush’s "axis of evil" includes North Korea, primarily based upon internal suppression of human rights, missile technology proliferation, and support of terrorism. Despite this assertion, construction begins on the first of the light-water reactors (LWR) agreed to in 1994. The U.S. reports North Korea’s admission of possessing an illegal nuclear weapons program, to be followed by an end to oil shipments in support of the first LWR under construction. North Korea restarts its previously closed nuclear reactor, opens closed facilities and expels IAEA employees.
- 2003: North Korea withdraws from the NPT. The date of their withdrawal is hilariously debated as the IAEA says they have to wait three months, North Korea say they original stated their intent in 1993, so its official now. During trilateral (China, North Korea, U.S.) talks, North Korea admits having nuclear weapons. North Korea launches two missiles, their first test since ’98 and their first since agreeing to a moratorium in ’99. North Korea breaks contact with U.N. Command responsible for monitoring the Korean Armistice. North Korean officials tell the Chinese they may test, export or use their nuclear weapons depending on U.S. action. The U.S., North Korea, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea meet for the first time to discuss the issue.
- 2004: The six nations talks occur once more, and agree to further meetings. No further meetings occur, as North Korea demands bilateral meetings with the U.S. and attempt to tie the issue to economic aid.
- 2005: North Korea issues statement that it possesses nuclear weapons and withdraws from further multilateral discussions. [sources: Financial Times, FoxNews, CNN, ACA]
The initial U.S. response has been to warn North Korea of the further isolation they will meet following the withdrawal from further discussions. The greater question, so far as I am concerned, is why on earth has the U.N. Security Council not taken action against North Korea.
The U.S., along with Japan, South Korea, China and Russia, should move immediately to have the U.N. Security Council demand, with a Chapter 7 resolution, compliance from North Korea. It is unlikely that it will happen, and less likely that if it does, that the sanctions would create a real change in North Korean policy. It would, however, show a global resolve for the economic and diplomatic isolation of North Korea. This too is a dangerous maneuver, as no one can know how Kim Jong Il will respond.
Similar to Iran, the people of North Korea would be the proper means to ending the situation, and the regime. Unfortunately there is apparently even less likelihood that the citizens of North Korea are prepared, inclined or capable of such a move. Isolation will, in this case, lead to further suffering.
Should China truly seek to have the Korean peninsula remain nuclear free, their response will most likely be the key. Thus far, they’ve not yielded a significantly strong enough voice against North Korea, and in all likelihood, they will not. Cutting off aid, in particular oil supplies, and supporting the complete economic and diplomatic isolation of North Korea, even if it never happens, would go along way to show that China is serious in its desire to see an end to the crisis.
A quick and proper Chinese response would go a long way toward relieving concerns I have about their efforts to weaken the U.S. I don’t expect it.
(Other coverage: FT, Xinhua, WaPo, Times of London, Scotsmen)
