Iran and Policy Talk
In his comments on the challenge before the Bush foreign policy team, Gregory Djerejian, questions whether the administration will follow the course of action represented by Pollack-Takeyh framework or that of what he terms the interventionist, such as Michael Ledeen. Ledeen responded in the comments and rightly so.
By way of background, the Pollack-Takeyh framework can be found in Foreign Affairs and describes their model for dealing with Iran’s defiance. The summary of their essay:
Summary: If Washington wants to derail Iran's nuclear program, it must take advantage of a split in Tehran between hard-liners, who care mostly about security, and pragmatists, who want to fix Iran's ailing economy. By promising strong rewards for compliance and severe penalties for defiance, Washington can strengthen the pragmatists' case that Tehran should choose butter over bombs.Prompting Mr. Djerejian’s comments was the news of the Bush administration’s consideration of the EU3’s proposal for dealing with Iran by means of economic and trade incentives in exchange for an end to the Iranian nuclear weapons program. I do not have the diplomatic expertise that Mr. Djerejian has, nor that of Ledeen, for I am but an amateur commentator on this issue basing my opinions my reading of the foreign policy journals and commentary of those who are educated in the field. Yet it strikes me that on this point, Djerejian is wrong, and by a long shot. Having linked to him and agreed with his commentary more than once, this isn’t a tirade against him.
First, the term interventionist is, as Ledeen notes, a term used for those advocating military action. Ledeen defends himself well enough on that issue. It strikes me that Djerejian has determined that any effort to hold Iran responsible for its actions or inaction is interventionist. The real trouble with the P-T framework is the requirement that our weak allies join us in a stand against Iran. As I’ve noted before all (the IAEA, the UN, the EU, Russia) have all failed to stand firm against Iran primarily due to their own economic ties to Iran or desire for greater economic ties.
I’m not opposed to the U.S. taking a look at all options. I would loudly oppose any policy that rewards Iran for obeying the law without clear and longstanding evidence of cooperation and compliance. The EU3’s plan, if reworked to significantly punish the Iranian economy, effectively ending trade through UN sanctions with additional significant sticks attached to any nation that violates the sanctions, would be the first step. If agreed to, thereby avoiding sanctions, and after sufficient openness and reassurance that no nuclear weapons program is being developed, then and only then would I favor more open trade with Iran. Of course this ignores the human rights abuses and support of terrorism by the hard-line mullahs.
We are not in a position to permit the carrots first approach for reasons that should be clear to all. Iran’s missile technology, terrorist ties, and advocacy for the destruction of Israel prevents any policy that permits them to either usurp the system or delay intervention until they’ve developed nuclear weapons. Does that make me an interventionist? If that means that we should act in support of the reformist in Iran, that we should act to prevent further delay, and that we should stand by our realization that Iran’s Mullahs must never possess nuclear weapons, then yes, I suppose it does. The alternatives are to do nothing or to feed the camel that bites you.
